Most automated theorem provers are clausal-form provers based on variants of resolutionrefutation. In my [1990], I described the theorem prover OSCAR that was based instead on natural deduction. Some limited evidence was given suggesting that OSCAR was suprisingly efficient. The evidence consisted of a handful of problems for which published data was available describing the performance of other theorem provers. This evidence was suggestive, but based upon too meager a comparison to be conclusive. The question remained, "How does natural deduction compare with resolution-refutation?" In the ensuing seven years, OSCAR has evolved in important ways, and other developments have made it possible to collect more accurate comparative data. Specifically, the creation of the TPTP library of problems for theorem provers, 1 and the availability of important theorem provers on the world wide web, make objective comparisons easier. These developments recently inspired Geoff Sutcliffe, one of the founders of the TPTP library, to issue a challenge to OSCAR. At CADE-13, a competition was held for clausal-form theorem provers.
1. Natural Deduction I take two characteristics to be definitive of natural deduction: (1) the reasoning proceeds by bidirectional search; (2) what are manipulated are sequents rather than formulas. I have elsewhere 5 described natural deduction systems as performing "interest-driven suppositional reasoning", which comes to the same thing. The sense in which it is suppositional reasoning is that it reasons with sequents rather than formulas. A sequent is a pair consisting of a formula and a set of formulas (the supposition of the sequent). Sequents will be written in the form p/X, where p is a formula and X is a set of formulas. Semantically, I will assign truth values to sequents, treating p/X as equivalent to the corresponding conditional ΠX ⊃ p (where ΠX is the conjunction of members of X). A sequent with an empty supposition will be identified with its sequent-formula.
In an interest-driven reasoner, we maintain two lists of sequents-conclusions and interests. Initially, the list of conclusions contains just the given premises, and the list of interests contains just the sequents we are attempting to derive (the ultimate-interests). Interest-driven reasoning proceeds by bidirectional search, reasoning forwards from the conclusions and backwards from the interests until the two strands of reasoning are brought together. Reasoning from conclusions to conclusions is performed in accordance with forwards-inference-rules and reasoning from interests to interests is performed in accordance with backwards-inference-rules. These will typically be disjoint sets of inference rules. (For further discussion of this aspect of interest-driven reasoning, see my [1990] or [1995] .) In sentential logic, the rules are applied by pattern matching. Here is a simple example of an interest-driven suppositional reasoner in action:
Given premises: ----Ultimate epistemic interests: then interest should be adopted in ~q/{~p}. We can express this by saying that REDUCTIO has two premises-one a forwards-premise and the other a backwards-premise. In deploying a backwardsinference-rule, the reasoner does not adopt interest in the forwards-premises. Only the backwardspremises give rise to interests, and they only do so when conclusions have already been drawn that instantiate the forwards-premises.
We can distinguish between three different kinds of backwards-inference-rules. Simple backwards-inference-rules have only backwards-premises-no forwards premises. In formal logic, most backwards-inference-rules are simple backwards-reasons, but my experience has been that in defeasible reasoning there are few simple backwards-inference-rules. Mixed backwards-inferencerules are backwards-inference-rules having both forwards-and backwards-premises. There can also be degenerate backwards-inference-rules that have only forwards-premises. Given an interest in the conclusion of a degenerate backwards-inference-rules, if the reasoner draws conclusions instantiating the forwards-premises, then a conclusion will be drawn instantiating the conclusion of the rule, but no new interests will be adopted. 6 To accommodate both forwards and backwards premises in backwards-inference-rules, they should now be written more generally in the form: {f 1 ,...,f n }{b 1 ,...,b m } ⇐ c [with discharge p] where f 1 ,...,f n are the forwards-premises and b 1 ,...,b m are the backwards-premises. For example, we can write the above rule of reductio-ad-absurdum as follows:
{q}{~q} ⇐ p with discharge ~p.
I will continue to write simple backwards-inference-rules in the form -{b 1 ,...,b m } ⇐ c≠ rather than -{}{b 1 ,...,b m } ⇐ c≠.
Forwards-inference-rules can also have both backwards-and forwards-premises. That is very useful in defeasible reasoning, 7 but I have not found it useful in formal logic, so that complication will be ignored in the present paper.
Backwards reasoning with a mixed or degenerate backwards-inference-rule will create an interest-scheme rather than an interest-link. An interest-scheme uses the target-interest to partially instantiate the forwards-premises. Those partially instantiated premises are recorded in the interest-scheme, and when conclusions are inferred that fully instantiate them, the resulting instantiation is used to instantiate the backwards-premises if there are any, or in the case of degenerate backwards-inference-rules to instantiate the conclusion of the rule. Once the backwards-premises are instantiated, interest is adopted in them and an interest-link is constructed to link them to the target interest. To illustrate, consider a backwards-inference-rule -{Fxy}{Gyz} ⇐ Hxz≠ where x,y,z are schematic variables. Given an interest in Hab, the forwards-premise is partially instantiated to -Fay≠, and an interest-scheme is constructed recording the instance -{Fay}{Gyb} ⇐ Hab≠ of the inference-rule. If -Fac≠ is concluded, that is used to fully instantiate the interest-scheme to produce the instance -{Fac}{Gcb} ⇐ Hab≠. This is recorded as an interest-link and interest is adopted in -Gcb≠. If -Gcb≠ is concluded, then -Hab≠ will be inferred. The difference between interest-schemes and interest-links is that the former have forwards-premises that have not yet been instantiated by conclusions.
We can regard a natural deduction reasoner as consisting of a simple loop. As new conclusions and interests are created, they are placed in a list called the inference-queue, which can be prioritized loop • Choose a member q of the inference-queue having maximal priority.
• Delete q from the inference-queue.
• If q is an interest, REASON-BACKWARDS-FROM q.
• If q is a conclusion, REASON-FORWARDS-FROM q, DISCHARGE-INTEREST-SCHEMES-FROM q, and DISCHARGE-INTERESTS-FROM q.
• If all ultimate-interests are discharged or the inference-queue is empty, return from the loop.
REASON-BACKWARDS-FROM interest
If the interest-sequent of interest is p/X, then given any backwards-inference-rule {f 1 ,...,f n }{b 1 ,...,b m } ⇐ c with discharge d, if there is a pattern-match m matching c with p:
• if there are no forwards-premises, • if d is non-NIL:
• add d/{d} to the list of conclusions and put it on the inference-queue.
• construct interests in the sequents m(f i )/X ∪{m(d)} and construct an interestlink whose resultant-interest is interest and whose link-interests consist of the new interests; • if d is NIL, construct interests in the sequents m(f i )/X and construct an interest-link whose resultant-interest is interest and whose link-interests consist of the new interests; • if some list of conclusions discharges the interest-link, infer interest from those conclusions, adding it to the list of conclusions and placing it in the inferencequeue.
• if there are forwards-premises,
• if d is non-NIL:
• construct an interest-scheme {m( 
REASON-FORWARDS-FROM conclusion
Given any forwards-inference-rule {f 1 ,...,f n } ⇒ f and any list p 1 /Y 1 ,...,p n /Y n of conclusionsequents (possibly with repetition) that includes the conclusion-sequent of conclusion, if there is a pattern-match m matching the list f 1 ,...,f n with the list p 1 ,...,p n , infer m(f)/(m(Y 1 ) ∪ ... ∪ m(Y n )) from the sequents p 1 /Y 1 ,...,p n /Y n , adding the former to the list of conclusions and placing it in the inference-queue. 
DISCHARGE-INTERESTS-FROM conclusion
If conclusion discharges interest, then for every interest-link whose link-interests contain interest, if conclusion together with some other conclusions jointly discharge the link, infer the link-target from those conclusions, adding it to the list of conclusions and placing it in the inference-queue.
A natural deduction system for sentential logic will be sound and complete if it contains an appropriate selection of inference-rules. In choosing inference rules, the basic desideratum is that they allow complex formulas to be broken into simpler parts. Let us define -¬p≠ to be q if p = -~q≠, and -¬p≠ is -~p≠ otherwise. Then the following set of backwards-and forwards-rules is sound and complete.
Forwards-Inference-Rules
Backwards-Inference-Rules
In the interest of efficiency, restrictions can be placed on the rule REDUCTIO requiring that p be a literal and q be either a literal or a conditional. This prevents the reasoner from following different backwards search paths to the same interests. Similarly, in FORTUITOUS-REDUCTIO, p can be required to be a literal and q to be atomic. The correctness of these restrictions will be proven in
Completeness
A subset of the rules of the previous section can be shown to be complete. This subset deletes MODUS PONENS, MODUS TOLLENS, and the second DISJUNCTION CONVERSION rule from the preceding list.
Let us define an ND-problem to be a pair 〈Γ,p〉 where Γ (the conclusions) is a set of formulas and p (the interest) is a formula. An ND-problem 〈Γ,p〉 is valid iff Γ ‹ p (where '‹' is the semantical implication relation). An ND-problem 〈Γ,p〉 is solved iff either p∈Γ or there is a q such that q∈Γ and -~q≠∈Γ. A reduction-rule is a relation whose extension is a set of pairs 〈ρ,Π〉 where ρ is an ND-problem and Π is a finite set of ND-problems. A reduction-rule is valid iff for every 〈ρ,Π〉 in its extension, ρ is valid if all members of Π are valid. A reduction-rule is sound iff it is valid and for every 〈ρ,Π〉 in its extension, if ρ is valid then all members of Π are valid. A solution to an ND-problem (relative to a set of reduction rules) is a finite (upside down) tree of reductions (a "reduction-tree"), where the top node is the problem solved and the leaf nodes are solved ND-problems. A set of reduction-rules is complete iff every valid ND-problem has a solution.
The rules for natural-deduction reasoning can be regarded as reduction-rules for ND-problems. The backwards-inference-rules reduce ND-problems to problems with different interests (and sometimes different conclusions). For example, ADJUNCTION reduces a problem of the form 〈Γ,(p&q)〉 to the pair of problems 〈Γ,p〉 and 〈Γ,q〉. CONDITIONALIZATION reduces a problem of the form 〈Γ,(p ⊃ q)〉 to the problem 〈Γ∪{p},q〉. REDUCTIO reduces a problem of the form 〈Γ,p〉 (where p is a literal) to a problem of the form 〈Γ∪{¬p},¬q〉 where q∈Γ and q is either a conditional or a literal. Note that REDUCTIO is taken to reduce a problem to any single problem produced in this way rather than to the set of problems produced in this way. It will follow from the discussion below that it makes no difference to completeness which reducing problem is selected.
In actual practice, the forwards-inference-rules are used to add formulas to the set of conclusions, but for present purposes I will construe them more narrowly as rewrite rules. A rewrite rule is a reduction-rule that reduces an ND-problem 〈Γ∪{p},q〉 to a set of ND-problems 〈Γ*,r〉 where p∉Γ*. For example, SIMPLIFICATION will be taken to reduce a problem of the form 〈Γ∪{(p&q)},r〉 to the problem 〈Γ∪{p,q},r〉. In the latter, -(p&q)≠ has been removed from the set of conclusions. If a set of rules is complete when the forwards-inference-rules are construed as rewrite rules, then a fortiori, it is complete if they are construed more generally as rules that simply add formulas to the list of conclusions. Note that MODUS PONENS and MODUS TOLLENS cannot be construed as rewrite rules, so it is important for the present completeness proof that these rules are not needed. These rules can, however, be cast as valid reduction rules. For example MODUS PONENS can be taken to reduce 〈Γ∪{p,(p ⊃ q)},r〉 to 〈Γ∪{p,(p ⊃ q),q},r〉.
Valid reduction-rules correspond to valid inference-rules. Sound reduction-rules satisfy the stronger condition that the validity of all the problems to which an ND-problem is reduced is a necessary and sufficient condition for the validity of the reduced problem. Soundness allows us to literally reduce the question of whether the given ND-problem is valid to the question of whether the problems to which it is reduced are valid. It is readily verified that all of the inference-rules for the propostional calculus correspond to sound reduction-rules.
Let us define a simple-ND-problem to be an ND-problem in which the conclusions and interests are all literals. Simple-ND-problems have simple solutions:
Theorem 1: If 〈Γ,p〉 is a simple ND-problem, Γ ‹ p iff either (1) p∈Γ or (2) there is a q such that q∈Γ and -~q≠∈Γ.
In other words, a simple-ND-problem is valid iff it is solved. Completeness can thus be established by showing that the rules reduce any valid ND-problem to a finite set of simple-ND-problems. The rules other than CONDITIONALIZATION and REDUCTIO allow us to reduce any ND-problem to a set of ND-problems in which all conclusions and interests are literals or conditionals. CONDITIONALIZATION eliminates conditionals from the interests. Thus repeated use of the rules other than REDUCTIO will reduce any ND-problem to a set of ND-problems in which the conclusions are either literals or conditionals and the interests are literals. Finally, REDUCTIO eliminates conditionals from the set of conclusions by enabling the following reduction (where r is a literal):
Thus systematic use of the rules reduces any ND-problem to a set of simple-ND-problems. Furthermore, the rules are all sound. Thus the rules allow the reduction of any valid ND-problem to a set of valid simple-ND-problems. By theorem 1, the latter problems are solved, so the reduction-tree constitutes a solution to the initial problem:
Theorem 2: The set of rules resulting from deleting MODUS PONENS, MODUS TOLLENS, and the second DISJUNCTION CONVERSION rule from the list of rules given in section one is complete.
Although MODUS PONENS, MODUS TOLLENS, and the second DISJUNCTION CONVERSION rule are not required for completeness, they play an important role in making the search for proofs more efficient. Reduction-trees do not look exactly like the reasoning that occurs in natural deduction, but there is a simple connection between them. In performing natural deduction reasoning in the propositional calculus, at each stage of the reasoning we will have a set of conclusions p 1 ,...,p n , q 1 /X 1 ,...,q m /X m and interests R 1 /Y 1 ,...,R k /Y k . The embedded ND-problems for this stage are all the ND-problems 〈Γ i ,R i 〉 where
If the inference-rules are treated as rewrite rules, the natural deduction reasoning succeeds in establishing the desired conclusions at a particular stage of the reasoning iff every embedded ND-problem for that stage is solved.
The connection is a bit more complicated if the rules are not treated as rewrite rules. For example, consider REDUCTIO. Suppose that the conclusions drawn thus far include two conditionals, (p ⊃ q) and (r ⊃ s). Treating REDUCTIO as a rewrite rule requires restricting the rule in such a way that there is a determinate order in which it must be applied to the conditionals. We do not ordinarily treat REDUCTIO in this way. In looking for a derivation, we may try different search paths simultaneously, applying REDUCTIO to both conditionals at the same time in the hope that one of these strategies will lead to a derivation more quickly than the other. This produces two different reduction-trees, as shown in figure one. The leaf nodes of both trees will then be embedded ND-problems for the current stage of the reasoning. However, to complete the reasoning, only one of the trees has to be expanded to the point where all the leaf nodes are solved. Thus it is no longer true that a solution requires every embedded ND-problem to be solved. Instead, there will be different "sufficient sets" of ND-problems such that if all members of any sufficient set are solved then a solution has been obtained for the original problem. Interest-links and interest-schemes provide a mechanism for keeping track of different sufficient sets so that the reasoner can tell when one of them consists entirely of solved ND-problems.
〈Γ∪{¬r,¬u},p〉 〈Γ∪{¬r,¬u},¬q〉 〈Γ∪{s,¬u},p〉 〈Γ∪{s,¬u},¬q〉
〈Γ∪{¬p,¬u},r〉 〈Γ∪{¬p,¬u},¬s〉 〈Γ∪{q,¬u},r〉 〈Γ∪{q,¬u},¬s〉 
Skolemization and Unification in Forwards Inference
Now let us turn to natural deduction in first-order logic. The task here is to extend natural deduction for sentential logic by adding rules for handling quantifiers and variables. The natural way to do this is to use skolemization and unification. Skolemization and unification are familiar parts of the machinery of automated theorem proving. However, their use has generally been confined to systems using variants of resolution-refutation, or tableau methods, or similar methods in which the desired conclusion is negated and added to the premises, the resulting set of premises is skolemized, and then a contradiction is derived. In my [1990] , I described an earlier version of OSCAR. A peculiar feature of that system was that it did not use skolemization and unification. Instead, it used "intuitive" rules of universal and existential instantiation and generalization that constructed substitution instances of quantified formulas, using all the (closed) terms that had occurred elsewhere in the argument:
"Intuitive" Instantiation and Generalization Rules:
universal instantiation: Where sb(x/t)p is the result of replacing free occurrences of x by t in p, from (∀x)p infer sb(x/t)p for any term t occurring elsewhere in the reasoning. universal generalization: If x 0 is a constant that does not occur in either the premises or p, then from sb(x/X 0 )p, infer (∀x)p.
existential generalization: For any term t, infer (∃x)p from sb(x/t)p.
It has always seemed that this should be a source of considerable inefficiency, because the same reasoning will be replicated for different substitution instances. This suggests that if a version of the natural deduction system could be produced using skolemization and unification, it might be more efficient. However, it was not obvious how to use skolemization and unification in natural deduction. I will explain the difficulties, and then propose a solution to them.
Skolemizing a formula consists of putting it in prenex normal form and replacing existential quantifiers by skolem functions. The only variables remaining are then universally quantified, so the quantifiers can be dropped without ambiguity. This can also be done one step at a time, dropping initial universal quantifiers (they do not occur within the scope of existential quantifiers) and converting initial existential quantifiers into skolem-functions whose arguments are all free variables in the formula. In natural deduction, just as in resolution refutation, conclusions can be skolemized in this way. If p is a formula whose free variables are x 1 ,...,x n and σ 1 ,...,σ k are the the skolem-functions occurring in p, let SC(p) (the skolem-closure of p) be (∃σ 1 ).
Theorem 3: If p is a formula and sk(p) is its skolemization, p is equivalent to SC(sk(p)).
, so the theorem is proven by induction on the order of the existential quantifiers.s
The relative order of the existential and universal quantifiers makes no difference in the skolemization.
In resolution-refutation, deductive problems are pre-processed by negating the conclusion, adding it to the list of premises, and then skolemizing the result. In natural deduction, it is more convenient to skolemize as we go along. This is done by adding the following four forwardsinference-rules (where it is assumed that distinct quantifiers contain distinct variables):
..,y n ))p where σ is a newly-constructed function symbol and y 1 ,...,y n are the variables having free occurrences in p.
Function symbols introduced by EI are skolem-functions. 0-adic skolem-functions are written as constants. A skolem-term is either a 0-adic skolem-function or an expression of the form σ(t 1 ,...,t n ) where σ is an n-adic skolem-function and t 1 ,...,t n are terms.
In forwards inference, we can use skolemization and unification in pretty much the same way it is used in resolution refutation. I will take a unifier to be a pair of functions 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 instantiating free variables. 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies p and q iff u 1 (p) = u 2 (q). This treatment of unification allows p and q to contain free occurrences of the same variable and have it instantiated differently in the two formulas. u 1 and u 2 will be identified with a-lists of substitutions. I will take unification to be defined for sequents as well as for formulas:
〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies p/X with q/Y iff there is an ordering X* of X such that 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies 〈p,X*〉 with 〈q,Y〉.
Unification can then be used in forwards-reasoning by modifying the definition of REASON-FORWARDS-FROM. First, notice that free variables in conclusion-sequents correspond to universal quantifiers, so they can always be rewritten to ensure that different conclusions-sequents contain different free variables. This is called "writing the variables apart". We can then revise the definition of REASON-FORWARDS-FROM as follows: as follows:
Given any forwards-inference-rule {f 1 ,...,f n } ⇒ f and any list p 1 /Y 1 ,...,p n /Y n of conclusionsequents (after writing the variables apart if necessary) that includes the conclusion-sequent of conclusion, if 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies the list p 1 ,...,p n with the list f 1 ,...,f n , infer
..,p n /Y n , adding the former to the list of conclusions and placing it in the inference-queue.
This use of skolemization and unification is illustrated by the following sequence of inferences:
In step 5, the inference proceeds by by unifying the list 〈(F x1) , ((F x2) ⊃ (G x2))〉 with the list 〈p, (P ⊃ q)〉, taking the free variables in the former to be {x1,x2} and the free variables in the latter to be the schematic variables {p,q}. The resulting unifier is 〈{(x1 . x2)} , {(q . (G x2)) (p . (F x2))〉, and the resulting conclusion is u 2 (q), which is (G x2).
Skolemization and Unification in Backwards Inference
The main problem concerning the use of skolemization and unification in natural deduction is how to use them in backwards reasoning and interest-discharge. The trick to making this work is to reverse-skolemize interest-formulas. The reverse skolemization of a formula simply reverses the treatment of universal and existential quantifiers. This is the same as negating the skolemization of the negation of the formula. For instance, the reverse skolemization of (∃x)(Fx ⊃ (∀y)Gxy) is (Fx ⊃ Gxσ(x) ). If p is a formula whose free variables are x 1 ,...,x n and σ 1 ,...,σ k are the the skolem-functions occurring in p, let RSC (the reverse-skolem-closure of p) be (∀σ 1 )...(∀σ k )(∃x 1 )...(∃x n )p. Then:
Theorem 4: If p is a formula and rsk(p) is its reverse-skolemization, p is equivalent to RSC(rsk(p)). Proof: By theorem 3, ~p is equivalent to SC(sk(~p)), and the latter is equivalent to ~RSC(rsk(p)), so p is equivalent to RSC(rsk(p)).s Interests undergo reverse skolemization by adopting the following four backwards-inferencerules:
sb(x/σ(y 1 ,...,y n ))p ⇐ (∀x)p where σ is a newly-constructed function symbol and y 1 ,...,y n are the variables having free occurrences in p.
Skolem-functions constructed by UG will be called i-skolem-functions to distinguish them from skolem-functions constructed by EI. The latter will be called c-skolem-functions. The interest-link constructed by UG must also have an attached "discharge-condition", which will be explained shortly.
The significance of reverse-skolemization is that it is used to guide interest-discharge. Consider a case in which a combination of instantiation and generalization operations should allow the discharge of an interest by a conclusion. Begin with a simple case in which the conclusion-formula is (F a) and the interest-formula is (∃y)(F y). When we strip the quantifier off the interest, we are then looking for a binding for the free variable. This is found by unifying (F y) with (F a) . The important observation is that, for purposes of unification, we treat y as a variable rather than as a constant. On the other hand, if the interest is (∀x)(F x), and we remove the quantifier to produce (F x) , this interest should not be satisfied by the conclusion (F a). So for purposes of unification, x should not be regarded as a variable. The interest (F x) should only be discharged by a conclusion of the form (F z) where z is a conclusion-variable (i.e., z is obtained by UI). What this indicates is that if interest-discharge is to be handled in terms of unification, we must reverse-skolemize the interests. That is, existential variables in the interest become free-variables and universal-variables become skolem-constants or terms built out of skolem-functions and free-variables. To illustrate this with a more complicated example, suppose the conclusion-formula is (∀x)(∃y)(∀z)(F x y z b) and the interest-formula is (∃u)(∀w)(∃v)(F a u w v). Applying UI and EI to the conclusion yields (F x (@y x) z b). Reverse-skolemizing the interest yields (F a ^u ^@w(u) ^v) . (Typographically, the implementation constructs skolem-functions by appending '@'. It distinguishes interest-variables and interest-skolem-functions from conclusion-variables and conclusion-skolem-functions by writing the former with preceding carats: ^x or ^@x.) These unify to give us (F a (@y2 a) (^x3 (@y2 a)) b). In general, the skolemization of a conclusion-formula unifies with the reverse-skolemization of an interest-formula iff the interest-formula can be obtained from the conclusion-formula by a combination of "intuitive" universal and existential instantiation and universal and existential generalization.
Using skolemization and unification, we revise the definition of interest-discharge as follows:
When all of the link-interests of an interest-link are "jointly discharged" (defined below), we say that the link itself is discharged, and we infer the result of applying the unifier to the link-target, adding it to the set of conclusions. For instance, the preceding reasoning was part of the following argument:
Given premises:
Ultimate epistemic interests: In this reasoning, conclusion 5 unifies with interest 2, discharging it and thereby discharging the interest-link between interests 1 and 2 and producing conclusion 6.
As in sentential logic, reasoning backwards produces new interests and interest-links attaching them to the target interest. However, the discharge of interest-links is made more complicated by the fact that p may unify with R and q with S while {p,q} fails to unify with {R,S}. Some of these failures of unification may be inessential, in that they can be fixed by rewriting free variables. For instance, given the conclusions Gx/{Fx} and Hx/{Fx}, we should be able to infer (Ga & Hb)/{Fa,Fb} by discharging interest in Ga/{Fa} and Hb/{Fb}. However, {Gx,Hx} does not unify with {Ga,Hb}. Because free variables in conclusions are implicitly universally bound, we can write the variables apart so that the conclusion formulas contain different free variables. Accordingly, let us define:
.., p* n /X* n 〉 results from writing the free variables apart, then for each i, 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies p* i /X* i into q i /Y i .
This has the desired result that 〈Gx/{Fx} , Hx/{Fx}〉 unifies into 〈Ga/{Fa} , Hb/{Fb}〉. Note, however, that individual unifiers can still fail to combine into joint unifiers. For instance, 〈Gx/{Fxy} , Hx/{Fxy}〉 does not unify into 〈Ga/{Faa} , Hb/{Fab}〉.
We can usually take a list of conclusions to discharge an interest-link if the list of conclusionformulas unifies into the list of interest-formulas for the link-interests. However, some inferencerules require that additional conditions be satisfied. For instance, UG produces an interest in F^x from an interest in (∀x)Fx. Given a conclusion F^x/X, we cannot validly infer (∀x)Fx/X if ^x occurs in X. Thus there must be a restriction precluding that. A second restriction is required as well. Consider the following invalid reasoning: The inference to conclusion 4 is invalid. This can be blocked by requiring that if a conclusion discharges interest in F^x via a unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉, u 2 does not reintroduce ^x.
To accommodate such restrictions, we attach discharge-conditions to link-interests. Dischargeconditions take the arguments conclusion unifier. The default discharge-condition is a vacuous condition. We then say that a list of conclusions discharges an interest-link via 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 iff 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies the list of conclusion-formulas into the list of interest-formulas for the link-interests, and for each i, the ith conclusion-formula (with rewritten variables if necessary) together with u 1 satisfies the discharge-condition (if any) for the ith interest. If a list of conclusions discharges an interest-link via 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉, u 2 is applied to the target-interest and the result is inferred. Note that the target-interest itself is not inferred. Reverse-skolemized formulas are not formulas the reasoner is trying to infer. Rather, they guide the course of inference by directing the search for conclusions that unify into them. We can accordingly revise our earlier procedures as follows:
If conclusion discharges interest, then for every interest-link whose basis contains interest, if conclusion together with some other conclusions jointly discharge the link via some unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉, infer the result of applying u 2 to the link-target, adding it to the list of conclusions and placing it in the inference-queue.
Making the discharge-condition explicit, UG should now be written as follows:
UG sb(x/σ(y 1 ,...,y n ))p ⇐ (∀x)p where σ is a newly-constructed function symbol and y 1 ,...,y n are the variables having free occurrences in p; the discharge-condition requires that if a conclusion discharges this interest via a unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉, then (1) σ does not occur in the result of applying u 1 to the conclusion-supposition, and (2) σ does not occur in u 2 .
If a backwards-inference-rule does not have a discharge, then reasoning backwards in accordance with it is unchanged from such reasoning in sentential logic. However, if there is a discharge, adding the supposition d/{d} to the list of conclusions can introduce free interestvariables and i-skolem-functions. It is not initially obvious that this is legitimate. We know how to interpret free variables and skolem-functions produced by UI and EI, but how should free interest-variables and i-skolem-functions be understood when they occur in conclusions? To sort this out intuitively, consider the simplest case of a backwards-inference-rule with a discharge-CONDITIONALIZATION. Given a reverse-skolemized interest (p ⊃ q), we want to find a conclusion (p* ⊃ q*) that unifies with it. Such a conclusion can be obtained by CONDITIONALIZATION from a conclusion q*/{p*}. But notice that the latter conclusion unifies with q/{p} iff (p* ⊃ q*) unifies with (p ⊃ q). Thus we can direct the search for (p* ⊃ q*) by looking for something that unifies with q/{p}, and then conditionalizing. This is done by adopting interest in q/{p} and reasoning backwards. To get something that unifies with q/{p}, we must make a supposition p*/{p*} that unifies with p/{p}, and then draw the corresponding conclusion q* with respect to {p*}. Thus we must look for an appropriate supposition p*/{p*} to make. This in turn can be done by making the supposition p/{p}, and treating it as a schematic supposition. That is, we treat the interest-variables in p as schematic variables, and instantiate them in any way that might lead us to a conclusion of the form q*/{p*}. This is analogous to the way we treat conclusion-variables in forwards reasoning. That is, we instantiate them in any way that is potentially useful, and our test for that is that by instantiating them in a particular way we can make a forwards inference. So we adopt the supposition p/{p}, and reason forwards from it, treating the interest-variables just like conclusion-variables for purposes of forwards reasoning. Accordingly, the only change required in the definition of REASON-BACKWARDS-FROM is in the clause governing discharge of the link or interest-scheme by pre-existing conclusions: Similarly, DISCHARGE-INTEREST-SCHEMES-FROM is changed only in that the conclusion is computed by applying the unifier to the interest-formula:
DISCHARGE-INTEREST-SCHEMES-FROM conclusion
Given any interst-scheme {f 1 ,...,f n }{b 1 ,. One change is required to the rule REDUCTIO. p must be allowed to be an existential generalization. This is because, as shown in section two, natural deduction proceeds by breaking formulas into simpler formulas, but the only way to do that with an existential generalization is by contraposing the reasoner's interests, converting existential generalizations into universal generalizations and then using UI and UG.
Here is an example that illustrates all aspects of the use of skolemization and unification in natural deduction:
Given premises: 
|----------------------------------------------------------| 18. ~(((F
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Soundness
In introducing the rules for using skolemization and unification in natural deduction, I have thus far relied upon loose intuitive arguments to make the procedures seem reasonable. Now I want to tighten this up. The objective is to show that if a closed formula containing no skolemfunctions that is derivable from a set of closed premises containing no skolem-functions, it is a deductive consequence of those premises according the standard semantics for first-order logic. To do that, we must define a semantics for the intermediate steps of the reasoning, which typically involve free variables and skolem-functions, and prove soundness relative to that semantics.
It is initially tempting to suppose that conclusion-sequents can be regarded as short for the skolem-closures of their corresponding conditionals. Unfortunately, that will not validate standard forward inferences. For example, from the conclusions Fx@y and Gx@y we can infer (Fx@y & Gx@y) . However, (∀x)(∃y)Fxy and (∀x)(∃y)Gxy do not jointly entail (∀x)(∃y)(Fxy & Gxy). To legitimate standard inferences, we must take the quantifiers to apply to all of the conclusion-sequents simultaneously. This suggests interpreting the set of conclusion-sequents as short for the skolemclosure of the conjunction of the corresponding conditionals of all the sequents in it. This would in fact be an adequate semantics if all of the reasoning were done in terms of forwards-inferencerules. However, it fails to validate inferences in accordance with one essential backwardsinference-rule-UG. Suppose, for instance, that the reasoner has drawn the conclusion (F^x ⊃ G^x) and from that we infer (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx). On the suggested semantics, we would be inferring (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx) from (∃σ)(Fσ ⊃ Gσ), but this inference is invalid.
The solution to this difficulty is a bit surprising. The c-skolem-functions introduced by EI and the i-skolem-functions introduced by UG work differently. The former replace existential quantifiers and the latter replace universal quantifiers. To get the semantics to work properly, if p is a formula whose free variables are X 1 ,...,X n and containing the i-skolem-functions σ 1 ,...,σ k and c-skolem-functions σ k+1 ,...,σ m , let the i-skolem-closure of p be (∀σ 1 )...(∀σ k )(∃σ k+1 )...(∃σ m )(∀X 1 )...(∀X n )p. I will abbreviate this as ISC(p). The soundness theorem to be proven will be that the i-skolemclosures of all conclusions are first-order consequences of the premises. This will be proven by proving more generally that at every stage in the reasoning, the i-skolem-closure of the conjunction of the corresponding conditionals of the conclusion-sequents follows from the premises.
To prove soundness, we must make some assumptions about the inference-rules. Where p is a formula whose free variables are X 1 ,...,X n and containing the skolem-functions σ 1 ,...,σ k , let ∀p be (∀σ 1 )...(∀σ k )(∀X 1 )...(∀X n )p. I assume:
Assumption 1: If {f 1 ,...,f n } ⇒ f is a forwards-inference-rule, then for any substitution instance
Assumption 2: If {f 1 ,...,f n } ⇐ f is a backwards-inference-rule other than UG, and the rule has no discharge, then for any substitution instance -{p 1 ,...,
Assumption 3: If {f 1 ,...,f n } ⇐ f is a backwards-inference-rule with discharge d, then for any substitution instance -{p 1 ,..., p n } ⇐ p≠, if d* is the corresponding substitution instance of d,
It is readily verified that the above inference rules satisfy these assumptions. In addition, UG corresponds to inferences that satisfy the following principle:
UG-principle: If σ is an i-skolem-function, σ * is a skolem term built from σ, p is a formula, X is a set of formulas, and σ does not occur in either X or sb(σ * /X)p, then (∃σ)[(ΠX ⊃ p) ⊃ (∀x)(ΠX ⊃ sb(σ * /X)p)] is valid in second-order logic.
The set of conclusion-sequents begins as the set of premises, and as reasoning proceeds it grows, forming the sequence C 0 ,...,C i ,... of lists of sequents. These represent "stages" of the reasoning. We can now prove two theorems by induction on the stage: Soundness Theorem: For every i ≥ 0, the i-skolem-closure of ΠC i is a deductive consequence of ΠC 0 .
Proof: Premises contain no free variables or skolem-functions, so this is vacuously true for C 0 . Suppose it holds for C i . C i+1 is generated by adding a conclusion-sequent to C i in one three ways:
(1) A conclusion-sequent can be added as a supposition generated by reasoning backwards from an interest. But suppositions have the simple form p/{p}, so if the theorem holds before adding a supposition, it will continue to hold.
(2) A conclusion-sequent q/X can be added as a result of forwards inference in accordance with some forwards reason-schema {p 1 ,...,p n } ⇒ q. In this case there will already be conclusion-sequents p 1 /X 1 ,...,p n /X n (with variables written apart) in C i such that some unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 unifies {p 1 ,...,p n } with {p 1 ,...,p n }, q = u 2 (q), and X = (u 1 (X 1 ) ∪ ... ∪ u 1 (X n )). It is required that the universal closure of any instance of a forwards reason-schema is valid, so
It follows that for any combination of quantifiers q and any formula Γ,
is valid, and hence
In particular,
so if the former is is entailed by the premises, so is the latter.
(3) A conclusion-sequent q/X can be added as a result of discharging an interest-link constructed in accordance with some backwards reason-schema {p 1 ,...,p n }{q 1 ,...,q m } ⇐ R. For all cases except UG, the reasoning is exactly the same as in (2). For UG we appeal to the UG-principle. Suppose p/X is in C i , and C i+1 is constructed by making an inference from p/X by UG. Then there is an i-skolem-function σ and a term σ* constructed from it and occurring in p but not in X or sb(σ*/X)p, where C i+1 = C i ∪ {(∀x)(ΠX ⊃ sb(σ * /X)p)}. The i-skolem-closure of ΠC i entails the i-skolem-closure of (∀σ)(ΠX ⊃ p). As σ does not occur in either X or sb(σ * /X)p, the universal closure of
is entailed by the i-skolem-closure of ΠC i . That is, the i-skolem-closure of ΠC i+1 is entailed by the premises.s
What lies behind the preceding argument is the fact that there is an asymmetry in the way in which i-skolem-functions and c-skolem-functions are introduced into conclusion-sequents. Cskolem-functions are introduced via EI to replace existentially bound variables, so in effect, they are existentially quantified when they are introduced. This is respected by the i-skolem-closure semantics. i-skolem-functions, on the other hand, can only be introduced into the list of conclusionsequents in two ways. They may be introduced in suppositions, in which case the universal closure is valid. Alternatively, they can be introduced in discharging an interest-link. This can happen if a free variable in one of the premises of the inference is unified with a term in the link-interests that contains an i-skolem-function. However, free variables in the conclusionsequents are universally bound, so we can also take the i-skolem-function to be universally bound.
Corollary 1: If for some i ≥ 0, S∈C i , then the i-skolem-closure of S is a deductive consequence of the premises.
Corollary 2:
If for some i ≥ 0, S∈C i , and S contains no free variables and no skolem-functions, then S is a deductive consequence of the premises.
The significance of Corollary 2 is that for formulas containing no free variables and no skolemfunctions, we can dispense with the i-skolem-closure semantics. If such a formula finds its way into the conclusion-sequents, then it itself follows from the premises.
When an interest-link is discharged, the conclusion drawn is not generally the same as the resultant interest-sequent of the link. We say that the conclusion "discharges" the interest, but how are they related logically? A partial answer is provided by the following theorem:
Theorem 5: If p is inferred by discharging an interest-link, ∀p entails the reverse-skolem-closure of the resultant-sequent of the link.
Proof: ∀p entails the instance by "intuitive" universal and existential instantiation, and the instance entails the reverse-skolem-closure by universal and existential generalization.
First-Order ND-Problems
We can characterize first-order natural deduction reasoning in terms of ND-problems in much the same way as that was done for the propositional calculus, although the characterization is now more complex. To begin with, the proper treatment of variables forces us to take ND-problems to consist of sequents rather than formulas. That is, an ND-problem will be a pair 〈Γ,p/X〉 where Γ is a set of sequents.
Next, the standard semantics for first-order logic defines '‹' only for closed formulas. In accordance with section five, we can extend it to open formulas by defining:
If Γ is a set of formulas and p is a formula, and either p or some member of Γ is an open formula, then
It is convenient to extend the definition still further to sequents by identifying sequents with their corresponding conditionals.
Let us define an open sequent to be a sequent p/X where either p is an open formula or some member of X is an open formula. In first-order natural deduction, interests that are open sequents are not the targets of the reasoning. Rather, the objective is to draw a conclusion that unifies into the open sequent. Accordingly, let us define:
An ND-problem 〈Γ,p/X〉 is valid iff there is a sequent p*/X* such that Γ ‹ p*/X* and p*/X* unifies into p/X. This captures the use of reverse-skolemization in interests. The only thing that unifies with a closed formula is itself, so we have the simple theorem:
By universal instantiation, if p*/X* is an open sequent and Γ ‹ p*/X* then Γ implies any instance of p*/X*. If p*/X* unifies into p/X via some unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 then there is a p**/X** such that u 1 (p*) = p** = u 2 (p) and u 1 (X*) ⊆ u 2 (X). p**/u 1 (X*) is then an instance of p*, so Γ ‹ p**/u 1 (X*). As u 1 (X*) ⊆ u 2 (X), it is also true that Γ ‹ p**/u 2 (X*). p**/u 2 (X) is an instance of p/X,so we have the following theorem:
Theorem 7: 〈Γ,p/X〉 is valid iff there is a p**/X** that is an instance of p/X such that Γ ‹ p**/X**.
We can define soundness and validity for reduction-rules just as in the propositional calculus. However, in first-order logic, the inference-rules do not all correspond to sound reduction-rules. If they did the reduction procedure would constitute a decision procedure, which is impossible by Church's Theorem.
Before addressing the soundness of the reduction rules, we must consider whether they are even valid. In the propositional calculus, the validity of the inference-rules guaranteed the validity of the reduction rules, but that relationship is no longer quite so simple in first-order logic. Numbered among the backwards-inference-rules are four "binary rules": ADJUNCTION, BICONDITIONAL INTRODUCTION, DISJUNCTION NEGATION, and CONDITIONAL NEGATION. These are rules having two backwards premises. The reduction rules produced by these rules in the propositional calculus fail to be valid in first-order logic. Consider ADJUNCTION. In the propositional calculus this produced a reduction rule reducing 〈Γ,(p&q)〉 to 〈Γ,p〉 and 〈Γ,q〉. The analogous rule in first-order Given premises: ----Ultimate epistemic interests:
This is of ultimate interest For interest 6 by REDUCTIO using node 4
For interest 6 by REDUCTIO using node 10 # 11
For interest 3 by REDUCTIO using node 10
For interest 6 by REDUCTIO using node 11 # 13
For interest 3 by REDUCTIO using node 11 
Inferred from { 17 } by CONDITIONALIZATION
Observe that REDUCTIO generates four interests in p relative to different suppositions, 5 interests iñ (~p ⊃ q) relative to different suppositions, two interests in ~q relative to different suppositions, and three interests in ~(p ⊃ q) relative to different suppositions. What is happening here is that the conclusions p, (~p ⊃ q), q, and (p ⊃ q) have been drawn, so each time a new reductio supposition is made, interest is adopted in their negations relative to that supposition. This then produces essentially the same backwards reasoning from each interest with the same interest-formula. For example, interest in ~(p ⊃ q) relative to different suppositions will produce interests in p and q relative to each of those suppositions. It seems that this backwards reasoning from "analogous" interests could all be done in parallel. Or more accurately, it could be done just once using a "variable-reductio-supposition", and then the resulting interests could be discharged multiple times by instantiating the variablereductio-supposition differently for different discharging conclusions. This can be implemented by marking appropriate interests as "reductio-interests". A reductio-interest will be any interest introduced by REDUCTIO or derived by reasoning backwards from another reductio-interest. We can modify the rule of REDUCTIO so that the reductio-supposition is no longer included in the interest-supposition of a reductio-interest. Thus a single reductio-interest can encode interest in the same sequent relative to many different reductio-suppositions. Let the non-reductio-supposition of a conclusion be the part of the conclusion's supposition that does not consist of reductiosuppositions, and let the reductio-ancestors be the part that does consist of reductio-suppositions. Then reductio-interests will be discharged by conclusions whose non-reductio-suppositions are contained in the interest-suppositions. More generally, let us say that a conclusion p/X unifies into a reductio-interest q/Y iff there is a unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 such that u 1 (p) = u 2 (q) and if X* is the non-reductio-supposition of p/X then u 1 (X*) unifies into u 2 (Y). A conclusion discharges a reductiointerest iff it unifies into it.
However, this is not yet a complete solution to the problem. This will minimize the adoption of reductio-interests, but the same reductio-interests will be adopted repeatedly with different interest-links in attempts to get different non-reductio-interests. If the reasoner concludes p and then adopts interest in ~p in order to get some other interest q (recording that in one interest-link), it will also adopt interest in ~p to get any other appropriate interest R (recording that in another interest-link). Thus we have tamed the profusion of interests, but we still get a profusion of interest-links. What this illustrates is that the use of interest-links is unnecessary in reductioreasoning, because that reasoning generalizes across a wide range of interests. This suggests treating such reasoning differently than we treat reasoning in accordance with other interest rules. We can think of such reasoning as consisting of three coordinated operations. First, we have an operation driven by drawing new conclusions. Whenever we conclude a sequent of an appropriate syntactic type, we construct a "direct-reductio-interest" in its negation. The conclusion is said to "generate" the direct-reductio-interest. Second, given an interest of an appropriate syntactic type, we make a reductio-supposition of its negation. Third, when (1) a new inferencenode has a reductio-supposition among its inference-ancestors, (2) its node-formula is that of a reductio-interest, and (3) its non-reductio-supposition is a subset of the supposition of the reductiointerest, then we can infer the negation of the reductio-supposition.
A sufficient condition for a conclusion to discharge a reductio-interest is that the conclusion unify into the interest, but that is not a necessary condition. Consider the following reasoning:
conclusions interests
S Suppose further reasoning produces the following conclusion:
Then the reasoner should discharge the interest-link to infer:
The thing to observe here is that although we want the conclusion S/{P,~Q} to discharge the interest S, the non-reductio-supposition of the conclusion is {P}, which is not a subset of the interest-supposition (the latter being empty). The source of the difficulty is that direct-reductiointerests are no longer tied by interest-links to the interests generating them. Instead, we regard each direct-reductio-interest as being generated by all interests that are syntactically appropriate for the generation of reductio-suppositions. Accordingly, the direct-reductio-interest (in this case, ~R) cannot inherit the supposition of the generating interest in Q/{P}. Let us define the inherited-non-reductio-supposition of an interest to be the list of all nonreductio-suppositions not in the interest-supposition that can be reached by working backwards from the interest through right-links, generating-nodes, and generating-interests. What should be required for interest-discharge of a reductio-interest is that the non-reductio-supposition of the discharging node be a subset of the union of the interest-supposition and its inherited-nonreductio-supposition. This can be simplified by noting that all reductio-interests have the same inherited-nonreductio-supposition. This is because the list of generating-nodes of a direct-reductio-interest is taken to be the list of all reductio-suppositions. Thus we can simply compute a single list of inherited-non-reductio-suppositions as we go along, augmenting it as needed when new reductiosuppositions are made. Then what is required for a conclusion to discharge a reductio-interest is that the conclusion be "appropriately-related" to the interest by a unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉 in the following sense: u 1 (p) = u 2 (q) and if X* is the set-difference of the non-reductio-supposition of p/X and the list of inherited-non-reductio-suppositions, then u 1 (X*) unifies into u 2 (Y).
REDUCTIO inferences are made in response to finding conclusions that discharge direct-reductiointerests, but one qualification is required. A distinction can be made between "base-reductiosuppositions" and other reductio-suppositions. A base-reductio-supposition is one that is generated from interests that are not themselves reductio-interests. Reductio-suppositions that are not base-reductio-suppositions can be generated from each other in any order, and so they can be discharged in any order. But base-reductio-suppositions must always be discharged last, after all other reductio-suppositions have been discharged. REDUCTIO inferences are then made as follows:
DISCHARGE-REDUCTIOS conclusion
• If conclusion has reductio-ancestors, then for any direct-reductio-interest interest to which conclusion is appropriately related by some unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉, let unifiers be the set of unifiers unifying u 1 (X*) unifies into u 2 (Y):
• Let Y be the node-supposition of node.
• For each conclusion* that generates the direct-reductio-interest slot of interest (i.e., interest is a reductio-interest in the negation of conclusion* ) and for each unifier* produced by first applying unifier and then a member of unifiers:
• Let Y* be the result of applying the second member of unifier* to the nodesupposition of conclusion*.
• For each reductio-ancestor R of conclusion or conclusion*, if either R is not a basereductio-supposition or it is the only reductio-ancestor of conclusion or conclusion*, and the node-formula of R is p, then draw the conclusion ¬p /Y∪Y*-{p}.
This procedure has the consequence that reductio-suppositions do not figure into the formulation of reductio-interests, thus avoiding the spiraling of interests described above, but when reductio-interests are discharged, the appropriate suppositions are computed so that they include any reductio-suppositions upon which the inference depends.
As described, the rule for discharging direct-reductio-interests only license inferences to the negations of reductio-ancestors of the contradictory conclusions giving rise to the inference. Although this is very natural, the resulting system is not complete for the propositional calculus. The difficulty is that it only draws reductio-conclusions from inconsistent suppositions. If the inconsistency arises from inconsistent premises, no reductio-conclusion can be drawn. The following is a simple example:
Readopting interest in: --------------------------------------------------- To achieve completeness, a call to DISCHARGE-FORTUITOUS-REDUCTIOS must be added to the reductio-discharge rules:
DISCHARGE-FORTUITOUS-REDUCTIOS conclusion
For each conclusion* whose conclusion-formula unifies with that of conclusion via some unifier 〈u 1 ,u 2 〉:
• If conclusion and conclusion* both have empty node-suppositions, then infer all ultimate interests from conclusion and conclusion*. • If conclusion discharges some interest generated by a supposition in the list of nonreductio-suppositions of conclusion*, and the supposition of conclusion is a subset of the supposition of conclusion*, then for each supposition sup in the list of non-reductiosuppositions of conclusion* and for every generated-interest in of sup, if conclusion is appropriately related to in by to the trivial unifier 〈∅, ∅〉, then where p is the result of applying u 1 to the interest-formula of in, sup is the result of applying u 1 to the supposition of conclusion, and sup* is the result of applying u 2 to the supposition of conclusion*, infer p/sup∪sup* from conclusion and conclusion*. • If conclusion* discharges some interest generated by a supposition in the list of nonreductio-suppositions of conclusion, and the supposition of conclusion* is a subset of the supposition of conclusion, then for each supposition sup in the list of non-reductiosuppositions of conclusion and for every generated-interest in of sup, if conclusion* is appropriately related to in by the trivial unifier 〈∅, ∅〉, then where p is the result of applying u 2 to the interest-formula of in, sup is the result of applying u 1 to the supposition of conclusion, and sup* is the result of applying u 2 to the supposition of conclusion*, infer p/sup∪sup* from conclusion and conclusion*.
With these changes, a natural deduction reasoner can handle REDUCTIO reasoning properly without replicating backwards reasoning. For instance, the problem with which this section began could now be done as follows: 
Conclusions
This paper has explored the logical foundations of automated natural deduction theorem provers and shown how to incorporate skolemization and unification into such systems. It has been shown that the key to accomplishing the latter is (1) to "reverse skolemize" interests, and (2) to use suppositions generated by CONDITIONALIZATION and REDUCTIO as schematic suppositions whose free variables are instantiated in the course of reasoning in whatever ways happen to be useful. The solution described here has been implemented in OSCAR. I am only aware of three natural deduction systems other than OSCAR-Pelletier's Thinker (Pelletier 1985 ), Dafa's ANDP (Dafa 1996) , and Rips' PSYCOP (Rips 1994) . The first two systems do not employ skolemization and unification at all, nor did the version of OSCAR described in my [1990] . PSYCOP does employ skolemization and unification to a limited degree, but as Rips observes, his use of them results in a system that is "grossly" incomplete. 8 To the best of my knowledge, OSCAR is the first natural deduction system using skolemization and unification in a way that is at least not known to be incomplete. My conjecture is that OSCAR is complete, but that remains to be proven.
